Intrinsic or Instrumental Support for Democracy in a Post-Communist Society: the Case of Serbia by Pavlović, Zoran
www.ssoar.info
Intrinsic or Instrumental Support for Democracy in
a Post-Communist Society: the Case of Serbia
Pavlović, Zoran
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Pavlović, Z. (2014). Intrinsic or Instrumental Support for Democracy in a Post-Communist Society: the Case of Serbia.
European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities, 3(1), 31-42. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-
ssoar-371236
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-NC-ND Lizenz
(Namensnennung-Nicht-kommerziell-Keine Bearbeitung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-NC-ND Licence
(Attribution-Non Comercial-NoDerivatives). For more Information
see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
 
 
 
Corresponding Author: Zoran , Ph.D., Assistant Professor Pavlović
Affiliation: Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Serbia 
Address: Cika Ljubina 18-20, Filozofski fakultet (Odeljenje za psihologiju), Beograd, Serbia 
e-mail: pavlozoran@gmail.com  
 
Copyright @ 2014,  Zoran Pavlović
European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities - EQPAM, Volume3, No.1, January 2014, pp. 31-42 
ISSN 2285 – 4916 
ISSN–L 2285 – 4916 
 
 
 
European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities  EQPAM  
Vol.3, No.1, January 2014 
                      ISSN 2285 – 4916 
                      ISSN-L 2285 - 4916 
Open Access at  https://sites.google.com/a/fspub.unibuc.ro/european-quarterly-of-political-attitudes-and-mentalities/ 
 
Page 31 
 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 Unported 
License. 
Intrinsic or Instrumental Support for Democracy in a Post-Communist Society. 
The Case of Serbia1 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Zoran  Pavlović
Department of Psychology 
Faculty of Philosophy 
University of Belgrade 
Serbia 
 
Date of submission: January 17th, 2014                                   Date of acceptance: January 23rd, 2014 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Abstract 
According to the cultural model of political culture and political change, citizens accept only those political 
and economic structures compatible with their relatively stable cultural orientations and political values, which 
are product of a common early socialization. An important implication of this view is that, after several 
decades of authoritarian rule and a lack of democratic political culture, the support for democracy in ex-
communist societies is rather instrumental than intrinsic, based not on values, but perceived system 
performances in political and economic terms. The rational choice (or institutional) model, on the other hand, 
posits that these evaluations of system performances are far more than just lip service to democracy; they 
shape the political attitudes and behaviours and contribute to the (lack of) allegiance to democratic 
institutions and norms. This paper aims at clarifying the importance of certain “institutional” and “cultural” 
variables for the general support to democracy in Serbia and their dynamic interplay. The data used in the 
paper were collected in the post-election survey, conducted after the May 2012 parliamentary and 
presidential elections on a representative sample of Serbian citizens (N=1,568). The relative importance of 
several predictors was analyzed: the socio-demographic variables (respondent’s age, educational level, 
monthly household income), the personality/dispositional variables (authoritarianism), the institutional 
variables (satisfaction with Serbian democracy and economy, evaluation of government performance before 
the election, the perceived level of respect for individual freedom and the quality of voters’ view 
representation in elections) and the cultural variables (political tolerance, nationalism, liberalism, socialist 
egalitarianism). The most important predictors of support for democracy were satisfaction with Serbian 
                                                          
1 This paper is the advanced version of the paper presented at the 2nd Edition of the Annual European Conference on Political 
Attitudes and Mentalities, ECPAM’2013, November 8th, 2013, University of Bucharest, Romania, and published in: C.F. Voinea, 
B. Todosijevic, G. Boella, “Political Attitudes and Mentalities. Eastern European Cultures: Modeling Studies”, Ars Docendi-
Bucharest University Press, pp. 137-154. 
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democracy (β=.21, p<.001) and evaluation of government performance (β=.21, p<.001); the citizens who 
were more satisfied with democracy and more inclined to positively evaluate the government performance 
were more supportive of democracy. The less authoritarian citizens (β=-.11, p<.01) and those who described 
their political views as liberal (β=.11, p<.01) were also more positively oriented towards democracy, proving 
the relevance of the more general and relatively stable political orientations. The quality of support for 
democracy in Serbia in intrinsic/instrumental terms was discussed in the concluding part. 
 
Keywords: political culture, political values, authoritarianism, democracy, Serbia. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
During the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1991), the majority of former communist 
countries underwent the process of transition towards the multiparty political system and free market, i.e. 
democracy. One of the most important tasks of the newly established democratic regimes was to propagate 
and develop citizens’ allegiance to democratic norms and values. However, the possibility of the 
development of pro-democratic political culture in a previously non-democratic society has been a very 
important theoretical and empirical question for decades and caused several disagreements between 
scholars.  
According to the proponents of the culturalist model (Almond & Verba, 1989; Eckstein, 1988; 
Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), democratic political structure is rooted in culture and has cultural preconditions. 
Citizens accept only those political and economic structures which are compatible with their relatively stable 
cultural orientations and political values. Being a product of the common (early) socialization, they can only 
be changed during the socialization process, under the influence of more general structural factors such as 
economic modernization, urbanization etc. (Almond & Verba, 1989; Eckstein, 1988; Huntington, 1991; 
Lipset, 1959; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). The prevailing political culture changes only slowly and in the long 
term, so it takes a long time for a democracy to consolidate in a previously non-democratic country 
(Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Klingemann et al., 2006). 
Although the citizens of post-communist countries, compared to those of Western societies, are 
generally less supportive of democracy (Klingeman et al., 2006; Pavlovic, 2007), the democratization of ex-
communist countries, despite prolonged systematic indoctrination, was accompanied by a high level of 
general support for democracy (Gibson, 1996; Klingemann et al., 2006; Mishler & Rose, 2002; Pavlovic, 
2007; Rose & Mishler, 1994).  
However, the proponents of the culturalist model argue that this “enthusiasm” for democracy 
cannot be taken for granted. Citizens of the former communist countries support democracy mainly (or 
only) because of the goals that developed democracies have achieved and as an instrument for their 
accomplishment. The standards for such evaluation are external, more prominent and less important 
manifestations of Western democracies’ performances (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel & Inglehart, 
2009). Because of the prolonged authoritarian rule and the lack of democratic (political) tradition, the 
support for democracy is rather a manifestation of the desirability of its effects (in terms of economic 
performances) than an expression of the acceptance of democratic norms and procedures, rights and 
freedoms that define its essence. In other words, it is nothing but an instrumental support, a mere lip 
service to democracy, a phenomenon similar to which Dalton (1994, p. 479) calls Fragebogendemokraten. 
Consequently, it speaks nothing of pro-democratic features of the prevailing political culture. 
The argument that the necessary condition for the consolidation of democracy in a former 
communist country is the shift in political culture (Klingemann et al., 2006) is strongly supported by some 
empirical data. Inglehart, for example, has repeatedly argued that self-expression values (Inglehart & 
 
 
 
 Zoran Pavlović: “Intrinsic or Instrumental Support for Democracy in a Post-Communist Society .The Case of Serbia” 
 
EQPAM Vol.3 No.1 January 2014  
ISSN 2285 – 4916 
 ISSN-L 2285 - 4916   
Open Access at  https://sites.google.com/a/fspub.unibuc.ro/european-quarterly-of-political-attitudes-and-mentalities/ Page 33 
Welzel, 2005) or, more recently, emancipative values (Welzel & Inglehart, 2009) are an essence of the 
democratic political culture. Aggregate (country level) measures of self-expression values are highly 
correlated with Freedom House scores and with some other composite indexes of democracy’s 
effectiveness (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), implying that the higher the mass acceptance of self-expression 
values, the more effective the country’s democracy, as well as the relevance of mass attitudes for the type 
and the quality of political system. Inglehart even argues that it is highly probable that democracy will 
emerge in a society where 45% of population embrace self-expression values (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). 
However, the acceptance of self-expression values in post-communist countries is lower not only compared 
to the Western societies, but even to poorer and less developed African and Asian countries (Inglehart & 
Welzel, 2005). 
However, if it is true that, due to the lack of democratic tradition, no previously non-democratic 
country can be democratized, than no country could become a democracy because there are none that did 
not “start” as an autocracy or became one at some point in history (Fukuyama, 1992). Germany after the 
World War II is but one example that authoritarian political culture can change rapidly under the changed 
institutional arrangements (Conradt, 1980; Verba, 1965). In other words, (political) structure can (and, once 
established, will) influence (political) culture. 
These arguments are in line with the rational choice (or institutional/lifelong learning) model. The 
main focus of this model is not on citizens’ normative convergences created by the socialization process 
but on the current social context, individual aspirations and opportunities, more recent political, economic 
and social events. The evaluation of system performances, in economic and political terms, and the quality 
of citizens’ experience with the system shape the political attitudes and behaviours and contribute to the 
(lack of) allegiance to democratic institutions and norms (Jackman & Miller, 1996; Mishler & Rose, 2002; 
Muller & Seligson, 1994). 
In a newly democratized society, citizens can and must learn to be “democrats” and that is only 
possible in the context of democratic civic culture and pluralism and through the experience with the 
democratic political process (Dalton 1994; Fleron, 1996; Niemi & Hepburn, 1995). This learning is based on 
experience; it is the effect of practice and the opportunities for practicing (due to the new institutional 
arrangements). For example, if human rights and freedoms are guaranteed for a longer time period, the 
citizens have plenty of opportunities to apply, practice and observe tolerance, pluralistic conflicts and 
interests and learn to value their worth (Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003). Evaluation of system’s 
performances in terms of the fulfilment of citizens’ demands and the accumulation of such experiences 
contribute to allegiance to democratic institutions and processes (Gibson, 2002; Mishler & Rose, 2002). 
Thus, it is not that important to create democrats as to create democracy; once established, it is highly 
probable that democratic institutions will produce democratic values in the end (Fleron, 1996). Some 
researchers have shown that democratization increases the importance of pro-democratic values 
(Schwartz & Sagie, 2000) or that some of the most important civic culture attitudes were rather effects than 
causes of democracy (Muller & Seligson, 1994).  
Under this paradigm, quite contrary to the culturalist assumption, instrumental support is far from 
being just lip service to democracy. It is one of the main mechanisms and a first step towards (re)building 
democratic political culture. There is empirical evidence that the levels of political tolerance (Duch & 
Gibson, 1992), trust in social and political institutions (Mishler & Rose, 1997) or support for marketization 
and democracy (Whitefield & Evans, 1999) in the post-communist countries can be explained in rational 
choice terms, i.e. the effects of economic and political performance evaluations. 
This paper focuses on the nature of support for democracy in Serbia where the democratic political 
system was introduced overnight in 2000, after almost half a century of communist regime, ten years of 
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Milosevic’s authoritarian rule and severe interethnic conflicts, international isolation, NATO bombing and 
political, social and economic collapse in the last decade of the last century. The support for democracy 
before, during and shortly after the democratic changes in 2000 was majoritarian in Serbia (Pavlovic, 2008; 
2010). At the same time, antidemocratic political attitudes and values were predominant in the Serbian 
population (Golubovic et al., 1995; Pantic, 2002; Pantic & Pavlovic, 2009). Some of the main features of the 
non-democratic political culture (e.g., authoritarianism and ethnocentrism) remained intact in spite of 
democratic changes and are still relatively widespread (Biro et al., 2002; Kuzmanovic, 2010; Pantic & 
Pavlovic, 2009).  
The studies linking support for democracy and acceptance of pro-democratic beliefs and values in 
Serbia are rare, but the available evidence suggests that the acceptance of democracy was quite weakly 
linked with the acceptance of some more general pro-democratic beliefs and values (social tolerance, 
autonomy, gender equality, market orientation etc.) (Pavlovic, 2010). Only a minority of Serbian citizens 
supporting democracy at the same time embrace democratic values, which is in line with the assumptions 
of the culturalist model.  
One possible explanation of these data is that mass protests, which caused the fall of Milosevic in 
2000, were rather motivated by a growing dissatisfaction with extremely poor life conditions than by intrinsic 
mass demands for democracy (Pavlovic, 2010). The other equally plausible explanation (but lacking 
empirical verification) is that the support for democracy is influenced by some institutional/instrumental 
variables. The analysis of the sources of support for democracy in Serbia, i.e. the importance of various 
“cultural” (political values and beliefs) and institutional (satisfaction/evalation) variables in explaining 
variations in preference for democracy is the aim of this paper. 
 
 
2. Method 
Sample and procedure. The data used in the analysis were collected in a post-election survey 
conducted on the representative national sample of eligible voters in Serbia by the Institute of Social 
Sciences, Belgrade, Serbia. The probability-based sample with multiple stages of selection and face-to-
face interviews was used (N=1,568). Data were collected in the period from December 2012 to February 
2013.   
Variables and measures. Several fundamental political beliefs and attitudes, usually regarded as 
some of the main features of the democratic political outlook, often used in the post-communist political 
culture studies (e. g. Gibson, 1996; Dekker, 1996; Duch & Gibson, 1992) and very relevant for the Serbian 
political context, were used. These included authoritarianism, political tolerance, nationalism, socialist 
egalitarianism and ideological self-identification.  
Variables were measured in the following ways: 
Authoritarianism. Six items of the scale of authoritarianism (α=.65) represented the content of the 
well-known F scale (Adorno et al., 1950) and RWA scale (Altemeyer, 1988). A similar scale was used in 
some previous studies (Todosijevic, 2006; 2013). Each item was followed by a five-point scale. 
Authoritarianism was operationalized as the first component yielded by the principal component analysis, 
explaining 31.18% of variance. All items showed positive factor loadings on the first component (see 
Appendix, Table 1). 
Nationalism. Nationalistic attitudes were measured by a seven item scale (α=.72) covering a 
variety of themes that are most often the content of the nationalistic worldview (Dekker et al., 2003). A 
similar scale was used in some previous studies (Todosijevic, 2006; 2013). The principal component 
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analysis yielded one factor, explaining 44.31% of variance. The obtained factor scores were used as a 
measure of nationalism. All items showed positive factor loadings (see Appendix, Table 2). 
Political tolerance. Political tolerance was measured by the least liked group method (Sullivan et 
al., 1979), using three items (α=.82). Respondents were asked to (dis)agree (on a five-point scale) on 
whether the members of the most disliked group they had in mind should or should not be banned, allowed 
to organize public demonstration or nominate themselves for public office. The principal component 
analysis yielded one component, explaining 73.43% of variance. Factor scores were treated as a measure 
of political tolerance. All items showed positive factor loadings (see Appendix, Table 3). 
Socialist egalitarianism. The Serbian post-election study included one item related to respondent’s 
general belief regarding the governmental role in economy and economic egalitarianism, which was treated 
as an indicator of socialist egalitarianism. Respondents were asked how strongly they (dis)agreed (1. 
strongly disagree/5. strongly agree) with the following statement “The government should take measures to 
reduce differences in income levels”. 
Liberal self-identification. Besides the usual left-right self-placement scale, an alternative method of 
measuring individual ideological positions was used. Respondents were offered several ideological labels 
(e.g. Conservative, Socialist, Patriot etc.) and asked to estimate on an eleven-point scale (0. Does not 
describe my view at all /10. Describes my views perfectly) how adequately they described their political 
views. The variable measuring the applicability of the Liberal label for one’s political views was used in the 
analysis. 
Five “satisfaction” variables were used, selected on the ground of some previous research with 
similar methodology and study aims (for example, Whitefield, 2005; Whitefield & Evans, 1999; Mishler & 
Rose, 1997) as well as the scope of the available data. These variables cover several economic and 
political evaluations of the functioning of the Serbian democratic political system.  
Evaluation of democracy. Measured by one four-point scale item “On the whole, are you very 
satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in Serbia?”. 
Evaluation of economy. Respondents were asked to estimate whether the state of the economy in 
Serbia had become better, stayed about the same or got worse. 
Government evaluation. Measured by one four-point scale item “Having in mind the results of the 
Government, how well do you think the government has done its job, during the last 4 years (before last 
elections)?”. 
Freedom and human rights evaluation. Respondents were asked to estimate the level of respect 
for individual freedom and human rights in Serbia on a four-point scale (1. no respect at all/4. a lot of 
respect). 
Perceived representation. Respondents’ evaluation of how well elections ensured that the views of 
voters were represented by Members of the Parliament (1. not well at all/4. very well) was treated as a 
measure of the perceived representation. 
Electoral system evaluation. Respondents evaluated the method of electing representatives as 
very good, good, bad or very bad. 
Higher values in the afore-mentioned variables implied more positive evaluations. 
Support for democracy. General approval of the democratic political system was the main 
dependent variable in the analysis. It was measured by a standard four-point scale (1. disagree strongly/4. 
agree strongly) item: "democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of government”. 
Socio-demographic variables. Respondent’s gender, age (measured in years), level of education 
(primary/secondary/tertiary) and monthly household income (estimated on the 11-point scale, 1. up to 9,999 
RSD/11. 100,000 RSD or more) were included in regression models as well. 
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3. Results 
The data were analyzed using the hierarchical regression analysis. Support for democracy was first 
regressed on socio-demographic variables. In the second model authoritarianism was added. Cultural 
variables were included in the third and institutional variables in the fourth step. The data are shown in 
Table 1. 
The first model explains only 3% of variance in support for democracy. Other predictors controlled 
for, the more affluent (β=.11, p<.001), educated (β=.10, p<.01) as well as female respondents (β=-.09, 
p<.01) showed higher support for democracy and vice versa. These findings can be interpreted as some 
sort of (educational and/or economic) deprivation based attitude towards democracy. Not having enough 
means can be a cause for criticism and cynical attitude towards the democratic regime, which is being 
blamed for the unsatisfactory standard of living. The dynamics of education influence is probably more 
complex. It is generally linked to a more liberal and pro-democratic political outlook. But this model rather 
describes than explains the variation in support for democracy. The fact that all of the included predictors 
lose their significance in the further steps of the analysis implies that the influence of socio-demographic 
variables is moderated by some dispositional and attitudinal variables. 
 
 
Table 1. Hierarchical regression analysis – four models of support for democracy 
Predictors Model 1  Model2  Model 3  Model 4  
Socio-demographic factors         
Gender (male) -.09 * -.09 * -.08 * -.07  
Age  .04   .06  .06   .06  
Education  .10 *  .08  .06   .06  
Household income  .11 **  .10 * .09 *  .08  
Dispositional factors         
Authoritarianism   -.13 ** -.12 ** -.11 ** 
Cultural factors         
Nationalism     .02   .04  
Political tolerance     -.02  -.04  
Liberal self-identification     .11 **  .11 ** 
Socialist egalitarianism     -.05  -.05  
Institutional factors         
Evaluation of democracy        .21 ** 
Government evaluation        .21 ** 
Evaluation of economy        .07 * 
Human rights evaluation        .01  
Electoral system evaluation        .04  
Perceived representation        .02  
Adjusted R Square  .03   .04  .05   .15  
Note: Entries are standardized regression coefficients; * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
 
Authoritarianism is but one example. Authoritarianism has been one of the most important 
concepts in explaining human political behaviour for decades, related to numerous attitudes and beliefs 
(see, for example, McFarland, 2010). It also bears special relevance for explaining political behaviour in 
Serbia (Pantic & Pavlovic, 2009; Todosijevic, 2006; 2013; Kuzmanovic, 2010), being one of the most 
important aspects of Serbian political culture in the past several decades. Adding authoritarianism in the 
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model improves its explanatory power significantly (R square change=.015, F 1, 719 = 12.44, p<.01), but 
only slightly (4% of variance). Higher authoritarianism was related with the lower support for democracy 
(β=-.13, p<.001), which is quite in line with the theoretical considerations on authoritarian personality as 
well as numerous research findings showing relations between authoritarianism and other attitudes and 
values that are antithetical to a democratic political outlook (Adorno et al., 1950; Meloen, 1993; McFarland, 
2010) or the level of state authoritarianism (Meloen, 1996). After authoritarianism is included in the model, 
the educational level loses its significance, while the influence of the income level remains significant. 
There is empirical evidence that nationalistic and authoritarian attitudes are related with economic and 
cultural deprivation in Serbia (Kuzmanovic, 1994; 2010) and the data in this study partly correspond to it. 
Although treated here as a dispositional variable, there are reasons to view authoritarianism as a form of 
traditional parochialism in the Serbian context (Biro, 2006; Kuzmanovic, 1994; Rot & Havelka, 1973), the 
idea not completely discarded by the original view of authoritarianism as a personality or dispositional 
variable (Sanford, 1973). This points to the relevance and continuity in political tradition. 
Adding nationalism, political tolerance, socialist egalitarianism and liberal self-identification in the 
third step further improves explanatory power (R square change=.015, F 1, 719 = 12.44, p<.01), but the 
model still explains only 5% of variance. Nationalism has a special relevance in the Serbian context as well 
since it has not only been (more or less) the official ideology of the ruling class for decades, but one of the 
most important dimensions of differentiation between the supporters of the relevant political parties in 
Serbia (Todosijevic, 2006; Pantic & Pavlovic, 2009). Political tolerance is one of the most important 
components of the democratic political culture, often used in post-communist studies (Gibson, 1998; 
Karpov, 1999; Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003), while socialist egalitarianism represents the general support 
for the economic aspect of societies liberalization, i.e. the rejection of some of the most important aspects 
of the former socialist political system (planned economy and economic egalitarianism). However, only one 
of the added predictors, liberal self-identification (β=.11, p<.001), is significant. The influence of 
authoritarianism remains significant, being the most important predictor (β=.12, p<.001). Gender and 
household income remain significant predictors as well.  
Out of all political attitudes and beliefs included in this study, authoritarianism seems to be by far 
the most important in explaining allegiance to democracy. Adorno et al. (1950) stated that political, 
economic and social beliefs of an individual were deeply rooted in his/her personality, which may be 
“regarded as determinant of ideological preferences” (p. 5, italics in the original). It seems that, in the case 
of Serbia, this holds not only for preference for democracy, but perhaps also for nationalism, political 
tolerance and socialist egalitarianism, which does not gain significance once the level of authoritarianism 
and demographics are controlled for (see also Todosijevic, 2013).  
Finally, adding the satisfaction variables significantly improves the model’s explanatory power (R 
square change=.10, F 6, 709 = 15.23, p<.01) and triples the percent of the explained variance (15%). The 
most important predictors of the support for democracy include satisfaction with government performance 
(β=.21, p<.001) and Serbian democracy (β=.21, p<.001) in general. Satisfaction with Serbian economy also 
significantly predicts the support for democracy, but it is the weakest predictor in the model (β=.07, p<.01). 
The respondents who evaluate these more positively are more supportive of democracy, which is what 
would be expected under the institutional model paradigm. None of the remaining institutional factors 
significantly influences the support for democracy. The influence of authoritarianism (β=.11, p<.001) and 
liberal self-identification (β=.11, p<.001) on the support for democracy remained significant, while none of 
the remaining cultural or socio-demographic variables significantly predicts support for democracy.   
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The non-significant effects of gender, age, level of education and income, when other predictors 
are controlled for, are informative as well. The differences in socialization practices and experiences related 
with gender and especially age are obviously not so important for allegiance to democracy. Age is 
considered to be one of the most relevant socialization variables, which gains special relevance in the post-
communist societies. The culturalist model predicts that younger cohorts, especially those not socialized 
under the authoritarian regime, should be more supportive of democracy. Some empirical evidence has 
shown that there were generational differences in that sense (Hahn, 1991; Hagenaars et al., 2003; 
Klingeman et al., 2006; Siemienska, 2006) and great similarity between youth in the post-communist 
countries and those in the old democracies (Catterberg & Zuasnabar, 2010; Moreno et al., 2010; 
Siemienska, 2003). This finding does not support the assumptions of generational differences in the 
Serbian society. Similarly, all other predictors controlled for, the level of education, systematically linked 
with a more liberal political outlook, does not play an important role in explaining individual differences in 
support for democracy. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
The presented data are not inconclusive. The most important predictors of support for democracy 
are satisfaction with the way democracy (in general) and government (in particular) work in practice. The 
support for democracy in Serbia is predominantly instrumental – the citizens rationally evaluate and prefer 
those political structures that act in their own or their own group’s best interest. Creating and upholding the 
functional Serbian democracy seems to be one way of causing allegiance to it. Securing benefits for the 
many would bring the prevailing satisfaction with the system performance and, in the end, a more 
favourable view on democracy.  
On the other hand, if the support for democracy is solely influenced by self-interest and individual 
or group benefits, one cannot help but wonder whether it is merely a lip service to democracy, as often 
argued by the proponents of the culturalist model (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel & Inglehart, 2009) – 
only instrumental support for democracy (based on its effects) and not intrinsic support (based on 
democracy as a value in itself).  
One additional question occurs. What does the word “democracy” mean for the Serbian citizens, 
who only had a limited experience with some formal democratic procedures while the truly functioning 
democracy is yet to come? There is evidence that the democratic political system loses its positive 
connotation in Serbia (Pavlovic, 2010), which is some sort of a “loving from afar” paradox: citizens fought 
for it, but got disappointed; not knowing what the true democracy really is, they already reject it under the 
impression of poor performances of the newly established democratic institutions that suffer from well-
known transitional “child diseases”. Furthermore, in some sort of institutional inertia, the new regime 
continues with the old practices and old rules of political games, which often only resemble democracy and 
only vaguely. This, above other things, contaminates its meaning (Pavlovic, 2010). At the same time, when 
“democracy” (wrongly?) equals “state securing jobs” or “free education”, the evaluation of democracy 
implies the evaluation of something only indirectly related to it.   
This raises the question of the stability of this type of support for democracy in a transitional society 
with its ups and downs in performance. If there is no deeper commitment to democracy, a certain reservoir 
of support, it is a small step from criticism of poor performance of the democratic regime to the rejection of 
the democratic political system. When allegiance to democracy is a manifestation of the underlying values 
that embrace it, the citizens increasingly come to a more liberal understanding of democracy, in terms of 
civil rights and freedom that empower people (Welzel & Inglehart, 2009). 
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On the other hand, one can wonder not just what a word “democracy” means but what Serbian 
citizens have in mind when evaluating “satisfaction” with democracy. Bearing in mind the poor state of 
Serbian economy, it is most probably the evaluation of democracy/government performance in economic 
terms. However, the satisfaction could imply the evaluation of the fulfilment of the democratic norms and 
values in practice, regardless of its economic consequences. In other words, the relevance of satisfaction 
variables does not (automatically) disqualify the relevance of deeper/value based commitment to 
democracy: evaluation standards can be individual’s values and beliefs, not only self or group interest. It is 
possible that several types of democracy supporters can be identified. Some limited evidence on Serbian 
youth political culture points in that direction (Pavlovic, 2012).  
Based on the presented data, we can say nothing more than that satisfaction variables are more 
important, but not sole or the main source of allegiance to democracy. Authoritarianism and ideological self-
identification explain some variation in the preference for democracy not accounted for by institutional 
variables. Lower authoritarianism and/or more prominent liberal self-identification equal the more pro-
democratic orientation. Some of the most fundamental and general determinants of political preferences 
play its part. In understanding and describing the development of support for democracy in a post-
communist society, a more integral and coherent approach is needed. It would include the structural, 
cultural and institutional variables. Some authors argue that „instead of asking whether institutions cause 
culture or culture causes institutions, we should look for their joint effects“ (Elkins & Simeon, 1979, p. 143) 
and that political culture evolves in a “reciprocal relationship between institutions … and values, 
fundamental political beliefs and implicit understandings” (Brown, 2005, p. 187). The consonance between 
the two is greater and more easily achieved if democratic institutions develop upward (from within the 
society) than downward (imposed on the society). The former statement more likely describes the Serbian 
situation, but nonetheless the data presented here point to the combined effects of the cultural and 
institutional variables as found elsewhere (Bennich-Bjorkman, 2007).   
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Appendix 
 
Table 1. Authoritarianism scale – Factor loadings on the first principal component 
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Obedience and respect for authority are the most important values for children .702 
People just reject youthful rebellious thoughts as they age .576 
Forgetting physical punishment leads to immoral conditions .497 
Authorities should censor the media .689 
Solve social problems by eliminating immoral people .686 
People can be divided into strong and weak .524 
        Note: Extraction method - Principal Component Analysis; no rotation; 38.18% of variance. 
 
Table 2. Nationalism scale – Factor loadings 
The Serbs should be proud of their people .658 
Serbia has a more glorious and tragic history than other nations .798 
Serbia contributes more to world culture and science .789 
More important politicians are patriots than experts .493 
Serbia should seek peaceful reunification .553 
Schools should pay more attention to patriotic education .647 
        Note: Extraction method - Principal Component Analysis; 44.31% of variance. 
 
Table 3. Political tolerance scale – Factor loadings 
Disliked group should organize public demonstrations .884 
Disliked group should nominate for public office .909 
Disliked group should not be banned .773 
       Note: Extraction Method - Principal Component Analysis; 73.53% of variance. 
